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Abstract We consider delegation in a rent-seeking contest with two play-
ers, where delegates have more instruments at their disposal than the main
players. We endogenize both the decision to hire a delegate and the contin-
gent fee oﬀered to the delegates. We characterize the situations when either
no, one or two players hire a delegate in equilibrium. We show that the
decision to hire a delegate depends in a non-monotone way on the size of
the contested prize.
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11 Introduction
This paper investigates endogenous delegation in the well-known rent-seeking
contest of Tullock (1980). We recall that in the standard Tullock contest
two players compete for a single prize. Each player exerts eﬀort in order to
increase the probability that he wins the prize. Tullock’s model has spawned
a vast literature and has been applied in many areas, like lobbying, environ-
mental regulation, litigation and sporting; see e.g. Nitzan (1994), W¨ arneryd
(2000), Liston-Heyes (2001), Lockard and Tullock (2001) and Szymanski
(2003). We consider here an extension of a two-player contest in which each
(main) player has the option to either compete himself or to hire a delegate
who competes on his behalf. Examples with delegation abound: ﬁrms can
hire professional lobbyists to acquire monopoly rents from the government,
or ﬁrms can hire lawyers to win lawsuits, etcetera.
Intuitively speaking, a reason why a player might decide to hire a dele-
gate could be that the delegate in some sense has a larger proﬁciency than the
player himself. We formalize this intuition by considering a model where a
delegate has the option to compete with two instruments, whereas a player
himself can use only one instrument. An example could be a case where
a ﬁrm wants the government to change the law such that it acquires a
monopoly rent. It might be that then the ﬁrm can only inﬂuence the gov-
ernment’s decision by lobbying political parties in the parliament, while a
professional lobbyist, in addition to this, might also put pressure on the gov-
ernment’s decision by e.g. using her (direct) contacts with inﬂuential oﬃcials
within the government or by advancing litigation for new precedents. The
speciﬁcation of our model borrows from Epstein and Hefeker (2003), who
presented an extension of the standard two-player Tullock contest (without
delegation) in which the players can compete with two instruments rather
than with just one. Epstein and Hefeker show that the results derived with
their model signiﬁcantly diﬀer from those derived with the standard Tul-
lock contest. Hence, one cannot innocently replace two instruments by one
instrument, eﬀort.
We assume that a player cannot observe the eﬀorts exerted by his dele-
gate. In order to cope with the moral hazard, each player oﬀers his delegate
a contingent fee, i.e. a delegate obtains a deliberately chosen fee if she
wins the contest and nothing otherwise. We investigate the following non-
cooperative three-stage game. In stage 1, each player decides whether or not
to hire a delegate. If a player decides to hire a delegate, then in stage 2 he
selects the delegate’s contingent fee. In stage 3 we have the actual contest
for the prize. If a player has not hired a delegate, then he competes himself
2in this stage; otherwise, his delegate competes on his behalf.
We derive the conditions under which no, one or both players decide to
hire a delegate in a (subgame-perfect pure-strategy) Nash equilibrium and
give the corresponding contingent fees. We establish the interesting ﬁnding
that the decision to hire a delegate does not depend in a monotone way
on the size of the contested prize. This is related to the fact that in some
equilibria delegates optimally use only one instrument, whereas in others
they prefer to use two instruments.
Some other papers have studied delegation (where delegates have only
one instrument at their disposal) in two-player contests. Baik and Kim
(1997) assume that delegates have a greater so-called ability than the players.
This means that, ceteris paribus, if a delegate exerts a certain eﬀort, then
this has a larger positive eﬀect on the probability that the player associated
to her will win the prize than if this player exerts the same eﬀort level
himself. Baik and Kim also endogenize the decision to hire a delegate – they
show that if a player hires a delegate, then the ability of this delegate must
exceed his own. However, in their analysis the payment schemes oﬀered to
the delegates are exogenously given. They assume that a delegate receives
an exogenously given contingent fee, and in addition to that a ﬁxed fee
(which depends on her ability) regardless of the outcome of the contest.
W¨ arneryd (2000) investigates a two-player contest where it is exoge-
nously given that both players must hire a delegate. He also assumes that
the delegates and players have identical abilities. For this situation, he en-
dogenously determines the equilibrium size of the contingent fee. In fact, it
turns out from his analysis that if the players would be able to decide to hire
a delegate or not, then they would face a prisoners’ dilemma: i.e. not hiring
a delegate would be a dominant strategy for each player, but both would
beneﬁt if both would hire a delegate. Delegation does not endogenously
arise in equilibrium in such a case, however.1 We stress that we endogenize
both the decision to hire a delegate and the contingent fee. Moreover, we
identify equilibria in which delegation does occur. We ﬁnally mention that
Schoonbeek (2002) examines one-sided endogenous delegation in a contest
where the two players have diﬀerent risk-attitudes, while Schoonbeek (2004)
analyses endogenous delegation in a contest between two groups of players.
The paper is further organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the
model and derive the equilibria. We conclude in Section 3. All proofs are
in the Appendix.
32 The model and the equilibria
Consider a contest with two risk-neutral players i = 1,2, in which one of the
players can win a prize of value V > 0. The contest is modelled as a non-
cooperative three-stage game. In stage 1, each player decides whether or not
he hires a risk-neutral delegate who will compete on his behalf in stage 3. If
a player does not hire a delegate, he will compete himself in stage 3. In stage
3, the relevant contestants compete for the prize by exerting nonrefundable
and nonnegative eﬀorts. The eﬀort of player i (if relevant) is denoted as ei
(i = 1,2). A delegate, if hired, can compete with two instruments in stage 3.
The eﬀort levels of these two instruments chosen by delegate i (if relevant)
are denoted as yi and zi (i = 1,2). Depending on the players’ decisions in
stage 1, we distinguish four possible cases in the remainder of the game: in
case (a) both players do not hire a delegate, in case (b) only player 1 hires
a delegate, in case (c) only player 2 hires a delegate, and in case (d) both
players hire a delegate. If player i decides to hire a delegate, then this player
oﬀers delegate i in stage 2 a contract that speciﬁes her payment. There is
moral hazard since player i cannot observe the eﬀort of delegate i in stage
3. Delegate i is oﬀered a contingent fee contract; she receives a fraction
0 ≤ γi ≤ 1 of the prize V if the prize is won for player i, and nothing
otherwise. Player i selects the value of γi. Delegate i accepts the contract
if her expected payoﬀ is nonnegative.
The probabilities that player 1 and player 2 receive the prize are de-
noted by, respectively, q and 1−q. The probabilities depend on the relative
magnitudes of the eﬀorts of the actual contestants. We use the speciﬁcation
proposed by Epstein and Hefeker (2003). In particular, if both players hire
a delegate (case (d)), then
q =
(1 + y1)z1
(1 + y1)z1 + (1 + y2)z2
(1)
if z1 + z2 > 0, whereas q = 1/2 if z1 + z2 = 0. Observe that (1) has the
following attractive properties: (i) both instruments are complementary to
each other, i.e. the second instrument yi reinforces the eﬀect of the ﬁrst
instrument zi; (ii) delegate i does not have to use the second instrument
(i.e. we can have yi = 0) - she will only use it if doing so positively aﬀects
her expected payoﬀ; (iii) if both delegates do not use their second instru-
ment, then (1) reduces to the standard Tullock contest success function
q = z1/(z1+z2). Notice that if we would have in (1) the term yizi instead of
the term (1 + yi)zi, then we would always have that yi = zi in equilibrium,
which is not very interesting. See further in Epstein and Hefeker (2003, p.
483). Proceeding, if only one player, say player i, does not hire a delegate
(cases (b) and (c)), then we replace in (1) (1 + yi)zi with ei. In the same
spirit, if both players do not hire a delegate (case (a)), then q = e1/(e1+e2)
if e1+e2 > 0, while q = 1/2 if e1+e2 = 0; i.e. then the situation boils down
to the standard contest of Tullock (1980).2
We will analyse the (subgame-perfect pure-strategy Nash) equilibria. Us-
ing backward induction, we ﬁrst investigate for each of the cases (a) to (d)
(i.e. for given delegation decisions), the corresponding equilibrium eﬀorts in
stage 3 and the equilibrium contracts in stage 2 (if relevant). Next, com-
bining the results of these four cases, we derive the equilibrium delegation
decisions in stage 1.
Case (a). In this case both players compete for the prize themselves in







V − ei, (2)
with i 6= j and i,j = 1,2. This case corresponds to the standard Tullock
(1980) contest. So, it is well-known that the equilibrium eﬀorts of both
players are ea
1 = ea
2 = V/4, while the expected payoﬀs are πa
1 = πa
2 = V/4.
Case (b). Now the contestants in stage 3 are delegate 1 and player 2. In





(1 + y1)z1 + e2

γ1V − y1 − z1, (3)





(1 + y1)z1 + e2

V − e2. (4)
The next lemma characterizes the equilibrium in stage 3.
Lemma 1 Consider case (b). For each 0 ≤ γ1 ≤ 1 there is a unique equi-
librium in the corresponding contest between delegate 1 and player 2 in stage
3. The following holds in this equilibrium:
(i) Delegate 1 uses one instrument if and only if 1/γ1 ≥
√
V − 1. The
corresponding eﬀorts are yb





(1 + γ1)2, eb
2 =
γ1V
(1 + γ1)2. (5)
5(ii) Delegate 1 uses both instruments if and only if 1/γ1 <
√
V − 1. The
corresponding eﬀorts are yb
1 = zb

















Hence, in case (b) delegate 1 uses both instruments if and only if, given
V > 1, the size of γ1 is large enough. Delegate 1 never uses both instruments
if V ≤ 1.
Turning to stage 2, we present the next result.
Lemma 2 Consider case (b). Deﬁne V0 ≡ 1
4(
√
2 − 1)−4 ≈ 8.49. In stage 2
the following holds:




2 − 1. Delegate 1 will use one instrument in the subsequent
equilibrium in stage 3. The corresponding expected payoﬀs of player 1









(ii) If V > V0, then there is a unique equilibrium in stage 2, in which
γb
1 = V − 1
4. Delegate 1 will use two instruments in the subsequent
equilibrium in stage 3. The corresponding expected payoﬀs of player 1









Lemma 2 shows that if V is larger than the threshold V0, then for player 1 it
is proﬁtable to oﬀer delegate 1 a contract that induces her to compete with
both instruments in stage 3. For smaller values of V , the contract oﬀered
to delegate 1 induces her to compete with one instrument only.
Case (c). Now the contestants in stage 3 are player 1 and delegate 2.
Obviously, this is the counterpart of case (b), and we can state results similar
to those of Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 by interchanging the indices 1 and 2. In
particular, if 0 < V ≤ V0, then there is an equilibrium in stage 2, in which
delegate 2 uses one instrument, with the following expected payoﬀs for the








2 − 1)2V. (9)
6If V > V0, then there is an equilibrium in stage 2, in which delegate 2 uses









Case (d). Now the contestants in stage 3 are delegate 1 and delegate 2. The
probability that player 1 wins the prize is given by (1). Given 0 ≤ γ1 ≤ 1





(1 + y1)z1 + (1 + y2)z2

γ1V − y1 − z1, (11)





(1 + y1)z1 + (1 + y2)z2

γ2V − y2 − z2. (12)
Investigating the situation in stage 3, we may assume without loss of gen-
erality that γ2 ≥ γ1 > 0 and present the following result.
Lemma 3 Consider case (d). For each 0 ≤ γ1 ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ γ2 ≤ 1, with
γ2 = kγ1 > 0 and k ≥ 1, there is a unique equilibrium in the contest between
the two delegates in stage 3. The following holds in this equilibrium:
(i) Both delegates use one instrument if and only if γ1V ≤ (1 + k)2/k2.
The corresponding eﬀorts are yd
1 = 0, yd









(γ1 + γ2)2. (13)
(ii) Delegate 1 uses one instrument whereas delegate 2 uses two instru-
ments if and only if (1 + k)2/k2 < γ1V ≤ (1 + k2)2/k2. The corre-
sponding eﬀorts are yd
1 = 0, yd
2 = zd

















(iii) Both delegates use both instruments if and only if γ1V > (1+k2)2/k2.
The corresponding eﬀorts are yd
1 = zd
1 − 1, yd
2 = zd
















7Lemma 3 shows that, for given k ≥ 1, both delegates use one instrument if
the contingent fee γ1V is small, whereas both delegates use both instruments
if γ1V is large. For intermediate values of γ1V , only delegate 2 – who has a
larger contingent fee than delegate 1 – uses both instruments.
Notice that the eﬀort levels (13) are identical to the equilibrium eﬀort
levels that would result in a standard Tullock contest between delegate 1 and
delegate 2, i.e. if they only would be able to compete with the instruments
z1 and z2. We further remark that Epstein and Hefeker (2003) also present
the results of part (iii) of Lemma 3. However, they do not discuss those of
part (ii).3
Proceeding with stage 2, we present Lemma 4. In turns out that in a
number of situations the equilibrium in stage 2 is not unique. However, fol-
lowing common practice, we can obtain uniqueness in those cases by focusing
on Pareto dominant equilibria. We call an equilibrium Pareto dominant if
there does not exist another equilibrium in which both players are strictly
better oﬀ.
Lemma 4 Consider case (d). Deﬁne V1 ≡ 3/(
√
3 − 1)4 ≈ 10.45 and let
V2 ≈ 12.45 be the unique positive root of ((3V )
1
2 +9)4 −27V 3 = 0. In stage
2 the following holds:




3. (If 0 < V ≤ 8, this is the unique equilibrium.)
Both delegates use one instrument in the subsequent equilibrium in











(ii) If V1 < V ≤ V2, then there are two Pareto dominant equilibria. In
the ﬁrst one, we have γd
1 = 1
3 and γd
2 = (3V )− 1
4. Delegate 1 uses
one instrument and delegate 2 uses both instruments in the subsequent
equilibrium in stage 3. The corresponding expected payoﬀs of player 1
and player 2 are:
πd










In the second one, we have γd
1 = (3V )− 1
4 and γd
2 = 1
3. Delegate 1 uses
both instruments and delegate 2 uses one instrument in the subsequent
equilibrium in stage 3. The corresponding expected payoﬀs of player 1
















Both delegates use both instruments in the subsequent equilibrium in











Using the above lemmas we turn to stage 1 and present our main result.
Proposition 1 Let V1 ≈ 10.45 and V2 ≈ 12.45 be as deﬁned in Lemma 4.
We then have the following with respect to the equilibria of the model:
(i) If 0 < V < 9, then there is a unique Pareto dominant equilibrium, in
which both players do not hire a delegate in stage 1. (If 0 < V ≤ 8,
this is the unique equilibrium.)
(ii) If 9 ≤ V ≤ V1, then there exist a unique Pareto dominant equilibrium,
in which both players hire a delegate in stage 1. In this equilibrium
both delegates use one instrument in stage 3, and their contingent fees
are V
3 .
(iii) If V1 < V < 16, then there exists a unique Pareto dominant equi-
librium, in which both players do not hire a delegate in stage 1. (If
V2 < V < 16, this is the unique equilibrium.)
(iv) If V = 16, then there exist equilibria in which both players, one player,
or zero players hire a delegate in stage 1. If a delegate is hired, she
uses two instruments in stage 3. If both delegates are hired, then their
contingent fees are V
3 ; if only one delegate is hired, then her contingent
fee is (
√
2 − 1)V .
(v) If V > 16, then there is a unique equilibrium, in which both player
1 and player 2 hire a delegate in stage 1. In this equilibrium both
delegates use both instruments in stage 3, and their contingent fees
are V
2 .
The proposition shows that, depending on the size of the prize V , we have
equilibria in which either no, one or both players hire a delegate. It is in-
teresting to compare this with the corresponding standard benchmark case,
9where we have a contest in which delegates have only one instrument at
their disposal. We recall from our discussion of W¨ arneryd (2000) that in
that case there is always a unique equilibrium in which the players do not
hire a delegate; in fact, in that case not hiring a delegate is always a dom-
inant strategy for each player in stage 1. Hence, introducing the option
that delegates use more than one instrument completely changes the set of
possible equilibria.
We further see from Proposition 1 that the decision to hire a delegate
does not depend in a monotone way on the size of V . In particular, we
have (Pareto dominant) equilibria with delegation for both 9 ≤ V ≤ V1 and
V > 16. This can be understood in an intuitive way as follows. First, for
the case with relatively ’small’ values of V , i.e. 9 ≤ V ≤ V1, we obtain a
unique Pareto dominant equilibrium in which both players hire a delegate.
We observe that in this equilibrium both delegates compete ’modestly’, in
the sense that they use only one instrument. Second, consider the case
with ’intermediate’ values of V , i.e. V1 < V < 16, and suppose that both
players hire a delegate in this case. It follows from the proof of Proposition 1
(see the Appendix) that we then have two subcases: (a) if V1 < V ≤ V2,
then one delegate uses one instrument whereas the other delegate competes
‘aggressively’ and uses two instruments; (b) if V2 < V < 16, then both
delegates compete ’aggressively’ and use two instruments. It turns out that
in subcase (a) it is proﬁtable for the player associated with the modest
delegate, to deviate unilaterally and not hire a delegate. Similarly, in subcase
(b) a unilateral deviation by any player is proﬁtable. In both subcases the
prize is not large enough to sustain an equilibrium with delegation by both
players. Third, take the case with relatively ’large’ values of the prize,
i.e. V > 16. We then have a unique equilibrium in which both players
hire a delegate and where each delegate competes aggressively by using
two instruments. Now V is so large that the aggressive behaviour of both
delegates can be sustained in equilibrium.
Finally, it also follows from the proof of Proposition 1 (see the Appendix)
that in the borderline case with V = 16, each player obtains a payoﬀ equal
to 4 in all possible situations. This explains part (iv) of Proposition 1.
3 Conclusion
We have analysed delegation in a two-person rent-seeking contest where
delegates can use two instruments whereas the players themselves can only
compete with one instrument. We endogenized both the decision to hire a
10delegate and the contingent fee oﬀered to the delegates. It turns out that,
depending on the size of the contested prize, we have (Pareto dominant)
equilibria in which no, one or both players hire a delegate. Interestingly, the
number of players that hire a delegate in equilibrium does not depend in a
monotone way on the size of the contested prize. It depends in a non-trivial
way on the interplay between the size of the contested prize and the decision
of the delegates to compete with either one or two instruments.
11Notes
1Baik (2006) similarly analyses a two-player contest with compulsory delegation where
the delegates and players have identical abilities. In his model the payment schemes for
the delegates consist of an endogenously determined contingent fee and a nonnegative
ﬁxed fee. Baik shows that in equilibrium the ﬁxed fee is set equal to zero.
2Recalling our discussion of abilities in Section 1, we mention here for completeness
the following. Take a standard two-player contest, and let the probability that player 1
wins the prize be p = λe1/(λe1 + e2), where λ > 1 is a given parameter. Then player 1
has a larger ability than player 2. Note that p > 1/2 if e1 = e2.
3We remark that Epstein and Hefeker (2003, Corollary 1) present a suﬃcient condition
such that one contestant uses one instrument while the other contestant uses both instru-
ments. Part (ii) of our Lemma 3 presents a necessary and suﬃcient condition. Epstein
and Hefeker also do not give (14).
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13Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1 – There is no equilibrium in which z1 = 0 and/or e2 =
0. Hence, the Kuhn-Tucker (KT) conditions characterizing an equilibrium
are
z1e2γ1V
((1 + y1)z1 + e2)2 ≤ 1 with an equality sign if y1 > 0, (A.1)
(1 + y1)e2γ1V
((1 + y1)z1 + e2)2 = 1, (A.2)
(1 + y1)z1V
((1 + y1)z1 + e2)2 = 1. (A.3)
First, consider yb




2. Substituting the latter equality, we ﬁnd (5). The condition
zb
1 ≤ 1 can be rewritten as 1/γ1 ≥
√
V − 1. Second, consider yb
1 > 0. The




2. Substituting, we obtain
(6). Using zb
1 of (6), we derive that yb
1 > 0 if and only if 1/γ1 <
√
V − 1. 
Proof of Lemma 2 – We present the proof in 3 steps. Using backward
induction, we analyse in steps 1 and 2 the cases where delegate 1 uses,
respectively, both instruments and one instrument in stage 3. We combine
results in step 3.
— Step 1: If delegate 1 uses both instruments in stage 3, it follows from
part (ii) of Lemma 1 that q = 1−γ−1
1 V − 1





1 V − 1
2)(1 − γ1)V. (A.4)
In the optimum γb
1 = V − 1





V . Next, we must guarantee that the condition
mentioned in part (ii) of Lemma 1 is satisﬁed. We observe that 1/γb
1 < √
V −1 holds with the value of γb




4 −1 > 0,
i.e. if and only if V > (1+
√
5
2 )4 ≈ 6.85. Remark that now the expected payoﬀ




— Step 2: If delegate 1 uses one instrument in stage 3, part (i) of Lemma 1







)(1 − γ1)V. (A.5)
14It follows that in the optimum we have γb
1 = −1 +
√
2, while the expected
payoﬀ of player 1 is πb2
1 = (
√
2 − 1)2V . Next, we must guarantee that the





V − 1 holds if and only if V ≤ 2/(
√
2 − 1)2 ≈ 11.66.
Remark that now the expected payoﬀ of player 2 is πb2
2 = V/2.
















2 − 1)2, we obtain that πb1
1 > πb2





Proof of Lemma 3 – There cannot exist an equilibrium in which z1 = 0
and/or z2 = 0. Consequently, the KT-conditions characterizing an equilib-
rium are
(1 + y2)z1z2γ1V
((1 + y1)z1 + (1 + y2)z2)2 ≤ 1 with an equality sign if y1 > 0,(A.6)
(1 + y1)(1 + y2)z2γ1V
((1 + y1)z1 + (1 + y2)z2)2 = 1, (A.7)
(1 + y1)z1z2γ2V
((1 + y1)z1 + (1 + y2)z2)2 ≤ 1 with an equality sign if y2 > 0,(A.8)
(1 + y1)(1 + y2)z1γ2V
((1 + y1)z1 + (1 + y2)z2)2 = 1. (A.9)
Recall that γ2 = kγ1 with k ≥ 1. Hence, in equilibrium we can only have
three situations: both delegates use one instrument; delegate 1 uses one
instrument whereas delegate 2 uses both instruments; or both delegates use
both instruments.
First, suppose that both delegates use only one instrument, i.e. yd
1 =
yd
2 = 0. The KT-conditions then show that zd
1 ≤ 1, zd
2 ≤ 1 and zd
1γ2 = zd
2γ1.
Using the latter equality, we ﬁnd zd
1 and zd
2 given in part (i). Next, remark
that zd
1 ≤ 1 if and only if γ1V ≤ (1 + k)2/k, and zd
2 ≤ 1 if and only if
γ1V ≤ (1 + k)2/k2. The condition on γ1V given in part (i) follows from
k ≥ 1. This proves part (i).
Second, suppose that delegate 1 uses one instrument, i.e. yd
1 = 0, whereas
delegate 2 uses both instruments. The KT-conditions then yield zd
1 ≤ 1,
zd
2 = 1 + yd
2 and zd
1γ2 = zd
2γ1. Using the latter two equalities, we derive zd
1
and zd
2 presented in part (ii). The condition on γ1V given in part (ii) follows
from the fact that zd
1 ≤ 1 can be rewritten as γ1V ≤ (1 + k2)2/k2, while
yd
2 > 0 is equivalent to γ1V > (1 + k)2/k2. This establishes part (ii).
Third, suppose that both delegates use both instruments. The KT-
15conditions then give zd
1 = yd
1 + 1, zd
2 = yd







2 given in part (iii). Observe that yd
1 > 0 if and
only if γ1V > (1 + k2)2/k2, and yd
2 > 0 if and only if γ1V > (1 + k2)2/k3.
The condition on γ1V given in part (iii) follows since k ≥ 1. This proves
part (iii). 
Proof of Lemma 4 – Using backward induction, we give the proof in 4
steps.
— Step 1: Assume that both delegates use one instrument in stage 3. With-
out loss of generality, we focus on the case with γ2 ≥ γ1 > 0. We then can
derive from part (i) of Lemma 3 that q = γ1/(γ1+γ2). Considering the corre-
sponding problems faced by players 1 and 2 in stage 2, we obtain the optimal
values γd
1 = γd
2 = 1/3 and the resulting expected payoﬀs πd1
1 = πd1
2 = V/3.
Remark that in this case the condition γd
2 ≥ γd
1 is trivially satisﬁed, while
the condition γd
1V ≤ (1 +k)2/k2 of part (i) of Lemma 3 holds if and only if
0 < V ≤ 12.
— Step 2: Assume that delegate 1 uses one instrument while delegate 2
uses two instruments in stage 3. Without loss of generality, we focus on





1 V − 1







1 (1 − γ1)
√
V . (A.10)
The optimal solution is γd








1 V − 1
2)(1 − γ2)V. (A.11)
Using γ1 = 1/3, the optimal solution for player 2 is γd
2 = (3V )− 1
4. The re-
sulting expected payoﬀs are πd2











1 = 1/3 in both the present case and in the case of step 1.
Comparing the proﬁts of player 2, we obtain that πd1
2 < πd2
2 if and only if
V > V1, where V1 = 3/(
√
3−1)4 ≈ 10.45. Next, examine for the present case




1V given in part (ii) of Lemma 3 are satisﬁed. First, γd
2 ≥ γd
1
if and only if V ≤ 27. Second, γd
1V ≤ (1 + k2)2/k2 if and only if V ≤ V2,
where V2 ≈ 12.45 is the unique positive root of (
√
3V + 9)4 − 27V 3 = 0.
Third, γd
1V > (1 + k)2/k2 if and only if V > V3, where V3 ≈ 9.37 is the
unique positive root of 9V 2 − ((3V )
1
4 + 3)4 = 0.
16— Step 3: Assume that both delegates use both instruments in stage 3.
Without loss of generality, we focus on the case with γ2 ≥ γ1 > 0. Part
(iii) of Lemma 3 then implies that q = γ2
1/(γ2
1 + γ2
2). The problem faced by








(1 − γ1)V, (A.12)








(1 − γ2)V. (A.13)
One can verify that in stage 2 we now have γd
1 = γd
2 = 1/2. The corre-
sponding expected payoﬀs of players 1 and 2 are πd3
1 = πd3
2 = V/4. No-
tice that in this case we trivially have that γd
2 ≥ γd
1, while the condition
γd
1V > (1 + k2)2/k2 mentioned in part (iii) of Lemma 3 is satisﬁed if and
only if V > 8.
— Step 4: Combining results, we obtain Lemma 4. Remark that if 8 < V ≤
V1, then there is an equilibrium with γd
1 = γd
2 = 1









2 in this case. Further, if V1 < V ≤ V2,
then (focusing on γd
2 ≥ γd




2 = (3V )− 1
4 and an equilibrium with γd
1 = γd
2 = 1
2. Only the former one




2 in this case. Finally,
the second equilibrium mentioned in part (ii) of Lemma 4 is the obvious
counterpart of the ﬁrst equilibrium mentioned there. 
Proof of Proposition 1 – Using backward induction, the expected payoﬀs
of case (a), Lemmas 2 and 4, and (9) and (10), we can construct the relevant
2×2 (normal form) payoﬀ table associated with stage 1 for all possible values
of V (in the tables ‘nd’ means no delegation, while ‘d’ means delegation).
— Let 0 < V ≤ V0. Using (7), (9) and (16), we obtain Table A.1. We
conclude that now there is a unique Pareto dominant equilibrium in which
both players do not hire a delegate. If 0 < V ≤ 8, this is the unique
equilibrium.
— Let V0 < V ≤ V1. We use (8), (10) and (16) to ﬁnd Table A.2. We con-
clude the following: if V0 < V < 9, then there is a unique Pareto dominant
equilibrium in which both players do not hire a delegate; if 9 ≤ V ≤ V1, then
there is a unique Pareto dominant equilibrium in which both players hire a
delegate. In the latter equilibrium, both delegates use one instrument.
— Let V1 < V ≤ V2. We use (8) and (10), while we have to examine two
possible cases in Lemma 4. First, using (17), we obtain Table A.3. Second,
17using (18), we obtain Table A.4. In both cases we have a Pareto dominant
equilibrium in which both players do not hire a delegate.
— Let V > V2. Using (8), (10) and (19), we arrive at Table A.5 and reach
the following conclusions. First, if V2 < V < 16, then there is a unique
equilibrium in which both players do not hire a delegate. Second, if V = 16,
then any combination of decisions of players 1 and 2 in stage 1 constitutes
an equilibrium (since each player receives payoﬀ 4 in all cases). If a delegate
is hired, she uses two instruments. Third, if V > 16, then there is a unique
equilibrium in which both players hire a delegate, and where both delegates


















Table A1: Expected payoﬀs for players 1 and 2 in stage 1 for 0 < V ≤ V0,




















Table A2: Expected payoﬀs for players 1 and 2 in stage 1 for V0 < V ≤ V1

















V 2 × 3− 5
4 × V
3
4, (1 − (3V )− 1
4)2V
Table A3: Expected payoﬀs for players 1 and 2 in stage 1 for V1 < V ≤ V2

















V (1 − (3V )− 1




Table A4: Expected payoﬀs for players 1 and 2 in stage 1 for V1 < V ≤ V2




















Table A5: Expected payoﬀs for players 1 and 2 in stage 1 for V > V2 using
(8), (10) and (19).
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